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TRANSGENDERED EMPLOYEES AND THE  
HETERONORMATIVE “UNIFORM” 
 
Uniform: (n) The distinctive clothing worn by members of the same organization or body 
or by children attending certain schools 
(adj.) not changing in form or character; remaining the same in all cases and at all times 
 
I Introduction 
The employment relationship involves a negotiation of images and perceptions.  
In the first instance, there is the employer.  The employer is sometimes an individual, 
sometimes a group of individuals, sometimes a concentration of financial interests, but in 
any case, it projects and promotes a uniform identity.  McDonalds.  Bank of America.  
Main Street Dry Cleaning.  Each entity makes a series of choices that shape its collective 
identity.  Of course, that identity necessarily includes within it a workforce comprised of 
the separate and distinct identities of various individuals.  The employee must suppress 
her
1
 individual identity at least to the extent that the latter deviates from the will of the 
employer.  For example, although the concessionist at the local corporate movie theater 
might dislike ruby red vests, she had better wear the vest if she wishes to continue 
working at the theater.  If she refuses, management can justifiably terminate her, 
assuming her employment is “at-will.”   
This essay explores the interplay of the employer’s “uniform” ideal with certain 
specific categories of employees who either knowingly deviate from that uniform or 
vainly struggle to find a place within it.  In particular, this essay will examine how 
                                                 
1
 This note will use “she,” “her,” etc. in gender-neutral hypothetical scenarios such as this one.  This should 
not be read to imply anything about the gender or gender identity of the person in the hypothetical unless 
expressly noted. 
 2 
employment discrimination law protects certain individuals from suffering adverse 
employment conditions where the employer’s pursuit of uniformity has encroached on 
individual freedoms.  Critical to obtaining a clear picture of transgendered employees in 
the workplace is an understanding of the history of employment discrimination law, 
particularly with respect to sex discrimination. 
Under “at-will” employment, an employer is free to terminate employees “for a 
good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all.”2  The employment-at-will regime protects 
employers from incurring civil liability upon terminating employees who “don’t fit in” in 
most cases.  If, however, the given employee “doesn’t fit in because she’s black” or a 
woman or a Mormon, the employer has violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964
3
 and, in all likelihood, a similar state antidiscrimination law,
4
 thereby subjecting the 
employer to liability.  In effect, Title VII made “race, color, religion, sex, and national 
origin” elements of the uniform workforce identity that the employer is not permitted to 
shape unless the characteristic is a “bona fide occupational qualification [BFOQ] 
reasonably necessary to the operation of that particular business or enterprise.”5  
Employers are rarely successful when asserting BFOQs as a defense, particularly when 
asserted with respect to race or sex.
6
 
 “Sex” has proven itself the knottiest, most heavily disputed Title VII category.  In 
one sense, the problem appears deceptively simple.  Discrimination because of sex 
                                                 
2
 William R. Corbett. The Ugly Truth About Appearance Discrimination and the Beauty of Our 
Employment Discrimination Law, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 153, 166 (2007). 
3
 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) 
4
 As of this year, 20 states and the District of Columbia have laws that protect gay, lesbian and bisexual 
employees in the workplace and twelve states extend workplace protections to transgendered employees. 
Vivian Berger, Half a Loaf is Worse, Broward Daily Bus. Rev. 5, Vol. 48, Iss. 244 (Nov. 26, 2007). 
5
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) 
6
 Kimberly A. Yuracko, One for You and One for Me: Is Title IX’s Sex-Based Proportionality Requirement 
for College Varsity Athletic Positions Defensible?, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 731, 743-44 (2003). 
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happens when an employer treats men and women differently.  Returning to the 
concessionists, if a movie theater manager terminates female concessionists who fail to 
wear their mandatory ruby red vest without terminating male concessionists guilty of the 
same violation, the manager has discriminated because of sex.  The shaky assumption 
implicit in the above example is that “men” and “women” are categories that are always 
manifestly distinct, a postulate referred to as the “gender binary.”7  Many legal scholars 
doubt whether the gender binary is an accurate and useful framework from which a court 
should evaluate “sex discrimination” claims, although this approach has not gained 
substantial momentum in the courts.
8
  It is beyond dispute, however, that “sex 
discrimination” under Title VII is broad enough to include claims that arise from “gender 
atypicality.”9  For example, where an employee “doesn’t fit in because she’s a lesbian” or 
“doesn’t fit in because she’s intersex,” the employer can use either of these bases to 
justify the termination without violating federal law; however, these latter justifications 
may lose their protected status if the employer has acted on the basis of how she believes 
a man or woman should behave.
10
   
 Consistent with the employers’ goals of promoting uniformity, employers are 
permitted to impose control over how an employee presents herself at work, both by 
requiring a work uniform and by establishing “grooming standards” for its employees.  
Courts have generally upheld an employer’s right and ability to impose grooming 
                                                 
7
 Anne Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule: Curing the Law's Failure to Protect Intersex Infants, 21 
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 59, 83 (2006). 
8
 See eg., Id.   
9
 Deborah Zalesne, Lessons From Equal Opportunity Harasser Doctrine: Challenging Sex-Specific 
Appearance And Dress Codes, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 535, 557 (2007). 
10
 See eg., James G. O’Keefe, Smith v. City of Salem and the Title VII Rights of Transsexuals, 56 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 1101, 1113 (2007). 
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standards.  For example, in Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Company11, the plaintiff 
bartender had worked for the defendant employer for nearly twenty years before the 
employer fired her for failing to conform to the company’s new “grooming standards,” 
which required female servers to wear makeup in a distinct way, and required male 
servers to maintain short haircuts and refrain from wearing makeup.
12
  Finding for the 
employer, the court held that such standards did not constitute sex discrimination under 
Title VII as long as they imposed an equal burden on men and women, an implicit 
validation of the gender binary.
13
  In Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,
14
 the First 
Circuit upheld a similar employer grooming code against a challenge that its policy 
against eyebrow-piercing discriminated against the plaintiff employee’s religion, the 
church of body modification.
15
 
Similar to grooming codes is the phenomenon of “appearance discrimination.”  
On its face, Title VII does not protect an employee who “doesn’t fit in because she’s fat” 
or “doesn’t fit in because she’s ugly,” however, either of these justifications could 
conceivably form the basis of a claim when coupled with a protected characteristic.  In 
other words, although firing an employee because she is ugly might be acceptable, firing 
an employee because she is an ugly woman likely violates Title VII, especially if there is 
evidence that the employment of men within the company is not equally as contingent on 
attractiveness.
16
 
                                                 
11
 Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004). 
12
 Id. at 1079. 
13
 Id. at 1081, 1083. 
14
 Cloutier v. Costco Whoesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2004). 
15
 Id. at 134. 
16
 See Corbett, supra note 2, at 166. 
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The employer’s desire and ability to control how its staff looks while at work 
derives from its prerogative to maintain a “uniform” identity.  In addition to cleanliness, 
hygiene, and glossy apparel, the employer more often than not has a desire to promote the 
image that its employees are gender conformists, a wish that is at odds with the 
experiences and identities of transgendered employees. 
II BACKGROUND 
A. “Sex” Discrimination, Title VII, and ENDA 
Title VII discrimination claims must be evaluated under a framework established 
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.
17
  A plaintiff must first establish a prima facie 
case of discrimination by demonstrating that: 1) he or she is a member of a protected 
class; 2) he or she is competent to perform the job or is performing duties satisfactorily; 
3) he or she suffered an adverse employment decision or action; and 4) the decision or 
action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination based 
on the plaintiff’s membership in the protected class.18 
The legislative record does not reveal any floor discussion of the “because . . . of 
sex” provision, primarily because it was added at the eleventh hour.19  Title VII had been 
predominantly a statute about ending racial discrimination; the addition of “sex” as a 
protected characteristic was a failed effort by Representative Howard Smith of Virginia, 
who opposed the bill and ultimately voted against it, to derail the legislation.
 20
  Although 
there was no substantive discussion of what sorts of things would fall under the umbrella 
                                                 
17
 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1972). 
18
 See eg., Dawson v. Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 215 (2nd Cir. 2005) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 
U.S. at 802).   
19
 The Harvard Law Review Association, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1111, 1167 (1971). 
20
 Id. 
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of “sex discrimination,” similar language had been used in prior legislation.  The year 
before the Civil Rights Act passed, Congress amended the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
adding a provision to prevent gender discrimination in the payment of wages with the 
following statutory language:  “No employer . . . shall discriminate . . . on the basis of sex 
by paying wages . . . at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of 
the opposite sex.”21  Accordingly, every circuit court that has addressed the specific issue 
has stated that transgendered employees are not a “class” under Title VII for purposes of 
sex discrimination.
22
  Traditionally, courts have held that the statute protects 
discrimination against “women because they are women and against men because they 
are men.”23   
Over the past sixteen years, several Congresspersons have proposed legislation 
that would provide protection against employment discrimination for transgendered 
employees, lesbian and gay employees, bisexual employees, or all of these.
24
  In 1995, 
the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), introduced by the late Senator 
Edward Kennedy, came within one vote of passing in the United States Senate.
25
  The bill 
would have protected lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) employees from 
workplace discrimination if it had passed in both chambers of Congress and been signed 
                                                 
21
 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (emphasis added). 
22
 See eg., Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984) (“Title VII is not so 
expansive as to prohibit discrimination against transsexuals.”); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080 
(7th Cir. 2000) (“Congress intended the term “sex” to mean “biological male or biological female.”); see 
also Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1977); Ettsity v. Utah, 502 F.3d 
1215 (10th Cir. 2007). 
23
 Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085. 
24
 Meredith R. Palmer, Finding Common Ground: How Inclusive Language Can Account For The Diversity 
Of Sexual Minority Populations In The Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 873, 
888 (2009).  
25
 Id. 
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into law.
26
  Instead, it has been a constant struggle for LGBT advocates who have been 
attempting to achieve such protection since that bill failed.
27
  To wit, some form of 
ENDA has been introduced by a Congressperson in every subsequent session of 
Congress, with the exception of the 109th Congress
28
 (a body that was popularly derided 
as a “do-nothing Congress” 29). Nevertheless, none of these bills attained sufficient votes 
in either chamber until September 2007.
30
 
ENDA finally received enough votes to pass in the House by a 235-184 vote, but 
the bill provided no protection for transgendered employees.
31
  When Rep. Barney Frank 
of Massachusetts had introduced an earlier incarnation of the bill, it had included 
protection for transgendered individuals, but that provision was eliminated before being 
submitted for a vote.
32
  Rep. Frank eliminated the transgendered provision when a Whip 
count had revealed that ENDA would fail if it included that provision, due to a lack of 
support among members of Congress.
33
   
There was an immense public outcry in the LGBT community when it was 
revealed that ENDA no longer protected transgendered employees from discrimination.
34
  
Proponents of the transgendered provision then introduced a second bill that would 
prohibit employment discrimination based on gender identity.
35
  The Education and 
Labor subcommittee conducted hearings on the subject of transgender discrimination in 
                                                 
26
 Id. 
27
 Id. 
28
 Id. at 888-89. 
29
 See Norman J. Ornstein & Thomas Mann, Our Do-Nothing Congress: Little Has Been Accomplished, 
Too Much Will Be Left Hanging, and What Was Done Was Done Badly, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 27, 
2006. 
30
 Palmer, supra note 24, at 889. 
31
 H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. (2007). 
32
 Sara Lubbes & Libby George, CQ Bill Analysis, Congressional Quarterly 2008 WLNR 2798852 (Feb. 9, 
2008). 
33
 Id. 
34
 Palmer, supra note 24, at 889. 
35
 H.R. 3686 110th Cong. (2007). 
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the workplace in the summer of 2008, during which Diane Schroer testified.
36
  Schroer 
was currently the plaintiff in a high-profile lawsuit against the Library of Congress for 
discriminating against her on the basis of ‘sex,” when it rescinded its offer of 
employment upon learning that she was transgendered and planned on undergoing sex 
reassignment surgery.
37
   
Nevertheless, ENDA died in the Senate; and the House bill that included 
protection for transgendered employees never came up for a vote in either chamber.
38
  
Currently, a House version of ENDA, which includes protection for transgendered 
workers, is once again percolating in the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 
Committee.
39
  Its future, once again, is uncertain.  While the 2007 version of ENDA that 
passed the House had the support of 35 House Republicans, the 202 co-sponsors of the 
2010 version of ENDA include only one Republican congressman.
40
  What has happened 
-- or, more appropriately, failed to happen -- in Congress is reflective of a reluctance of 
many Americans to accept transgendered individuals into the mainstream.  
Transgendered individuals still face widespread discrimination and prejudice in several 
areas in addition to employment -- from “ credit, public accommodations, and law 
enforcement to more private areas such as marriage, parenting, healthcare, and 
inheritance.”41  As long as transgendered individuals are forced out of other areas of 
mainstream society, they will not be a part of the employer’s idealized workplace and 
                                                 
36
 House Education Subcommittee Reviews Workplace Transgender Discrimination,  U.S. Fed. News (HT 
Syndication) 2008 WLNR 12174648 (June 27, 2008). 
37
 Id. 
38
 Palmer, supra note 24, at 889. 
39
 H.R. 3017 111th Cong. (2010). 
40
 GOP Support for Gay Rights Measure Slips, Roll Call (USA), Apr. 27, 2010 WLNR 8628446. 
41
 Demoya R. Gordon, TRANSGENDER LEGAL ADVOCACY: WHAT DO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORIES HAVE TO 
OFFER?, 97 Cal. L. Rev. 1719 (2009). 
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will likely suffer the  added indignity of having their struggles ignored by the federal 
government. 
 B. “Sex Discrimination” in the Courts 
With Congress reluctant to expand or define the contours of actionable “sex 
discrimination,” this has left the judiciary in the position of deciding what constitutes 
actionable “sex discrimination” under the statute.  One of the most radical changes in 
judicial interpretation of sex discrimination under Title VII occurred in Price Waterhouse 
v. Hopkins.
42
  In Price Waterhouse, an accounting firm decided not to promote Hopkins, 
a female candidate for partnership, and the evidence suggested that part of the reason she 
was passed over was because her personality was adjudged too aggressive and abrasive 
for a woman, notwithstanding whether these characteristics would be desirable in a male 
candidate.
43
  Thus, Hopkins’ challenge to Price Waterhouse’s employment decision 
represented a challenge to its uniform ideal, one in which men were powerful dealmakers 
and women were subservient, attractive, and ultimately powerless pawns in the corporate 
hierarchy.  
The Supreme Court held that Price Waterhouse’s conduct constituted sex 
discrimination actionable under Title VII.
44
  Writing for the plurality opinion, Justice 
Brennan wrote, “[a]n employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose 
positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out 
of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not. Title VII lifts women 
out of this bind.”45  Moreover, the Court held that “remarks based on sex stereotypes . . . 
                                                 
42
 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
43
 Id. at 231. 
44
 Id. at 251. 
45
 Id.  
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can certainly be evidence that gender played a part” in an employment decision in such a 
way that violates Title VII.
46
 
In the immediate aftermath of Price Waterhouse, some courts had held that its 
loosely defined gender-nonconformity doctrine only applied to opposite-sex Title VII 
claims, and not claims based on same-sex discrimination.
47
  In Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Services, Inc., the Supreme Court disagreed, holding that same-sex 
discrimination could form the predicate of a Title VII sex discrimination claim.
48
  “The 
critical issue,” Justice Scalia opined for the majority, “is whether members of one sex are 
exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the 
other sex are not exposed.”49 
The federal courts soon cited Price Waterhouse and Oncale in advancing the 
gender-nonconformity line of cases.  In Nichols v. Azteca, a plaintiff waiter with 
effeminate tendencies brought suit against his employer, a restaurant whose employees, 
including supervisors, constantly derided him by referring to him as “faggot,” “she,” and 
far more vulgar expressions.
50
  The Ninth Circuit agreed with Nichols that “the holding in 
Price Waterhouse applies with equal force to a man who is discriminated against for 
acting too feminine.”51  Likewise, in Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., the 1st 
Circuit held: 
Just as a woman can ground an action on a claim that men 
discriminated against her because she did not meet stereotyped 
expectations of femininity, a man can ground a claim on evidence 
                                                 
46
 Id. 
47
 See eg., Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F.Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988); McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of 
Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996) 
48
 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc, 523, U.S. 75 (1998). 
49
 Id. at 80. 
50
 Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 866 (9th Cir. 2001).     
51
 Id. at 874. 
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that other men discriminated against him because he did not meet 
stereotypical expectations of masculinity.
52
 
 
As the gender-nonconformity doctrine grew in force, it became simultaneously 
apparent that gay and lesbian plaintiffs could not use the doctrine to “bootstrap protection 
for sexual orientation into Title VII.”53  The reason why Price Waterhouse sex 
stereotyping claims could not be applied to gay and lesbian plaintiffs, as explained by the 
Second Circuit, was “because not all homosexual men are stereotypically feminine, and 
not all heterosexual men are stereotypically masculine.”54  Thus, while an employer may 
construct for itself an identity that activity excludes gays and lesbians, the employer is 
prohibited from doing so in a way that appeals to sex stereotypes. 
What society deems culturally “feminine” and culturally “masculine” is 
necessarily premised on a “stereotype,” a social determination regarding which gender 
preferences or characteristics are conventionally associated with biological males and 
females.
55
  These culturally assigned characteristics and preferences encompass 
everything from “physical appearance to clothing and self-presentation, to personality 
and attitude . . . to patterns of speech and behavior.”56 
These cultural stereotypes dominate mainstream conceptions of gender, which in 
turn inform the ideological perspectives of American employers.  The importance of the 
Price Waterhouse decision was that it circumscribed the extent to which employers may 
rely on stereotypes that permeate society in making employment decisions.  The 
importance of Price Waterhouse to the federal courts, such as the Sixth Circuit in Salem, 
                                                 
52
 Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999). 
53
 Simonton v. Runyon, 292 F.3d 33, 38 (2nd Cir. 2000). 
54
 Id. 
55
 Monica Diggs Mange, The Formal Equality Theory in Practice, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2007). 
56
 Id. 
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was the radical notion that judges may look beyond the simplest applications of Title VII.  
Indeed, judges can apply the statute in situations where the employer’s desire to shape the 
workplace in conformity with mainstream stereotypes frustrates the autonomy of the 
employees who constitute that workplace.   
 
III RESTRICTIONS ON “APPEARANCE” AT WORK 
 
A. Transgendered Discrimination in Smith v. City of Salem 
With gays and lesbians lacking standing to sue under Title VII and “gender-
nonconforming” plaintiffs uniquely situated for bringing employment discrimination 
lawsuits as long as they were the victims of sex stereotyping, where does that leave 
transgendered employees? 
As alluded to earlier, transgendered individuals, like gay and lesbian individuals, 
are not a protected “class” under Title VII. 57  Nevertheless, in the wake of Price 
Waterhouse, the gender-nonconformity doctrine provided transgendered plaintiffs with 
an avenue to pursue Title VII claims.  A transgendered plaintiff finally got that 
opportunity in Smith v. City of Salem.
58
  In that case, Smith had worked for the fire 
department for nearly seven years before he was diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder 
and hence began “expressing a more feminine appearance” at work.59  Smith’s coworkers 
told him that he was not acting “masculine enough” and Smith afterwards complained to 
a supervisor, who shortly thereafter made arrangements with other city officials to have 
                                                 
57
 See eg., Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984) (“Title VII is not so 
expansive as to prohibit discrimination against transsexuals.”); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080 
(7th Cir. 2000) (“Congress intended the term “sex” to mean “biological male or biological female.”); see 
also Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1977); Ettsity v. Utah, 502 F.3d 
1215 (10th Cir. 2007). 
58
 Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004). 
59
 Id. at 567. 
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Smith terminated.
60
  The Sixth Circuit reiterated that transgendered was still not a Title 
VII class, but nevertheless held that Smith had successfully stated a valid Title VII claim, 
under Price Waterhouse, by alleging that sex stereotyping about how a man should act 
“was the driving force” behind the Department’s suspension of Smith.61  Thus, for the 
Sixth Circuit, the employer lacked the power to shape identity and impose uniformity 
when it came to dictating how men behave as men or, for that matter, as women. 
B. Grooming Codes, Stereotypes, and Appearance Discrimination 
Growing out of and, to some extent, away from the gender-nonconformity line of 
cases are a series of cases related to “grooming standards” and dress codes in the 
workplace.  The most pivotal current “grooming standards” case is Jespersen v. Harrah’s 
Operating Co.
62
  In Jespersen, the plaintiff bartender had worked for the defendant 
employer for nearly twenty years before the employer fired her for failing to conform to 
the company’s new “grooming standards.63  Under these grooming guidelines, “All 
beverage servers were required to be ‘well groomed, appealing to the eye, be firm and 
body toned, and be comfortable with maintaining this look while wearing the specified 
uniform.’”64  Furthermore, “[f]emale beverage servers were required to wear stockings 
and colored nail polish, and they were required to wear their hair ‘teased, curled, or 
styled,’” while “[m]ale beverage servers were prohibited from wearing makeup or 
colored nail polish, and they were required to maintain short haircuts and neatly trimmed 
fingernails.”65 
                                                 
60
 Id. at 567-68. 
61
 Id. at 574-75. 
62
 Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1104.  
63
 Id. 
64
 Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1077. 
65
 Id. 
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A three-judge panel affirmed the district court’s granting of summary judgment 
on behalf of the defendant casino.
66
  On rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit came up 
with an intermediate holding, ruling for the employer, but carving out a space for future 
plaintiffs to bring sex stereotyping claims arising from grooming requirements.
67
  
Specifically, the court held that “appearance standards, including makeup requirements, 
may well be the subject of a Title VII claim for sexual stereotyping,” but that Jespersen 
had failed to provide sufficient evidence either that the burdens imposed by the policy 
were unequal or that the policy itself “require[d] Jespersen to conform to a stereotypical 
image that would objectively impede her ability to perform her job requirements as a 
bartender.”68 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit elevates the importance of weighing relative burdens 
experienced by each sex.  Recall from the introduction of this essay that Title VII 
prohibits the movie theater manager from firing the female concessionists who fail to 
wear the ruby red vest unless she also terminates the male concessionists who do the 
same.  Jespersen stands for the proposition that the manager actually can do just that, as 
long as it is consistent with a company grooming code and as long as wearing the vest is 
not considered a burden as compared to wearing a different uniform and vice versa.    
 In Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,
69
 the First Circuit explored the interplay 
between grooming standards and religious discrimination.  For claims of religious 
discrimination under Title VII, the plaintiff must first make a prima facie case that a bona 
fide religious practice conflicts with an employment requirement and was the reason for 
                                                 
66
 Id. 
67
 Id. at 1079. 
68
 Id.  
69
 Cloutier, 390 F.3d at 126. 
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an adverse employment action.
70
  The burden then shifts to the employer to show that it 
offered a reasonable accommodation or, if it did not offer an accommodation, that doing 
so would have resulted in undue hardship for the employer.
71
  The plaintiff in Cloutier 
was terminated for wearing eyebrow rings in contravention of the company’s “no-facial-
jewelry” policy, an action that the plaintiff claimed violated her right to practice her 
religious beliefs as a member of the Church of Body Modification.
72
  The First Circuit 
did not have to address whether the plaintiff met her burden of making a prima facie 
claim of religious discrimination, because, the court held, the imposition on the 
company’s “good grooming regulations” was destructive to defendant Costco’s “public 
image” and thus constituted an undue hardship.73 
In Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C.,
74
 the Eighth Circuit held that a 
defendant hotel chain committed actionable sex discrimination under Title VII where the 
record reflected that the hotel fired the employee because her appearance -- short, 
“tomboyish” haircut and a lack of makeup -- did not match the stereotypically feminine 
“midwestern girl” look, which the employer desired in a front desk employee.75  The 
court rejected the legal conclusion made by the district court below, which had cited 
Jespersen for the proposition that sex stereotyping claims required “comparative 
evidence,” i.e. affirmative evidence that one group (women, e.g.) were treated worse than 
another group (men, e.g.).
76
  The court found instead that a plaintiff could support a sex 
stereotyping claim under Title VII by proffering comparative evidence, evidence of 
                                                 
70
 Id. 
71
 Id. at 134. 
72
 Id. at 127. 
73
 Id. at 136-37 
74
 Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033 (8th Cir. 2010). 
75
 Id. at 1035. 
76
 Id. at 1037-38. 
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“remarks that reflect a discriminatory attitude,” or any other evidence that would “permit 
a reasonable inference of discrimination.”77  
 Related to, but distinct from, grooming code restrictions is the concept of 
“appearance discrimination.”  In Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., a supervisor instructed a 
female sales manager to terminate a female sales associate and “get somebody hot.”78  
This is an example of sexual attractiveness as an element of the heteronormative work 
uniform.  When the manager refused the supervisor’s request, she herself was terminated.  
The employee plaintiff had stated a valid retaliation action by alleging that she was 
terminated for a refusal to comply with an order that she believed to be discriminatory.
79
  
Standing somewhat in contrast to this case is Goodman v. L.A. Weight Loss Centers, 
Inc..
80
  In Goodman, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania upheld dismissal of an obese 
man’s ADA suit against weight loss company who wouldn’t hire him as a sales 
counselor, adding in dicta:  
 [I]t is well established that an employer is permitted to make hiring decisions 
based on certain physical characteristics. The mere fact that Defendant was aware 
of Plaintiff's weight and rejected his application for fear that his appearance did 
not accord with the company image is not improper. To hold otherwise would 
render an employer's ability to hire based on certain physical characteristics 
entirely void.
81
 
 
Goodman demonstrates that it the employer may permissibly extend the “work uniform” 
over which she has control to include the employee’s own physical body. 
Commentator Jane M. Siegel addresses the issues of physical body requirements 
as well as grooming restrictions with respect to women in particular and concluded that 
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such rules and restrictions implicate society’s obsession with women’s clothing.82  The 
fixation on women’s clothes itself relates to the recurrent desire in Western civilization to 
diminish the power of women, Siegel writes, by characterizing them only according to 
their appearance, because of the outdated, but still pervasive notion that “women are their 
bodies.”83  Thus, the employer, catering to dominant social norms, grafts an idealized 
image onto its personnel, and the distinctions between body and dress become fused in a 
hegemonic work uniform.  
C. Intersex Employees and “Body” Discrimination 
 The most obvious instance where the work uniform interacts with an employee’s 
actual physical body occurs in instances where an individual has suffered workplace 
discrimination on the basis of being intersexed. “Intersexuals” is a term that refers to a 
“congenital anomaly of the reproductive and sexual system.”84  There are a wide variety 
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of different physical conditions that result in an individual being classified as “intersex”85 
and it is estimated that there are millions of Americans who are intersex.
86
 
Only one reported case, Wood v. C.G. Studios, has addressed whether intersexuals 
are entitled to protection from employment discrimination on the basis of “sex” when 
they are discriminated against for being intersexuals.
87
  Although this Pennsylvania case 
was based on the commonwealth’s own employment discrimination statute as opposed to 
Title VII, the court cited the Title VII transsexual cases as support for its holding that 
intersexuals were not protected by the statute.
88
  The plaintiff in Wood brought a claim 
against her former employer, alleging that the reason she was terminated was because her 
defendant employer found out that she had undergone “gender-corrective surgery” to 
“correct her hermaphroditic condition” at some point previous to her employment with 
the defendant. The court held that under the plain meaning of the Pennsylvania statute, 
the law was intended to bring about “equality between the sexes,” and that terminating an 
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employee who had undergone gender-corrective surgery did not constitute discrimination 
because of “sex.”89 
The problem, which the Wood case brings to the forefront, is that, as commentator 
Julie Greenberg’s compendium of the scientific research indicates, “sex,” even in the 
anatomical sense, is a fluid concept that is sometimes difficult to categorize.  Bearing this 
in mind, how could a court arrive at the result that sex discrimination laws are about 
achieving “equality between the [two] sexes,” when an honest scientific evaluation of the 
gender binary renders this approach immensely underinclusive. 
D. Schroer v. Billington  
In Schroer v. Billington, the District Court for the District of Columbia addressed 
an employment discrimination claim by a male-to-female transsexual plaintiff.
90
  The 
plaintiff, Diane Schroer, born David Schroer, had achieved great success as a highly 
decorated member of the United States military for 25 years, though during that time she 
was diagnosed with gender dysphoria.
91
  Schroer applied for a position at the Library of 
Congress, while appearing as a man during the interview.
92
  After she was offered the 
position by a representative of the Library, Schroer revealed her gender dysphoria and her 
intention to undergo sex reassignment surgery and fulfill the position as a woman.
93
  
After revealing this information, the offer of employment with the Library was 
rescinded.
94
  Schroer then brought a Title VII action against the Library, claiming 
discrimination on the basis of sex.
95
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When it first addressed the Schroer claim on a motion to dismiss, the District 
Court of D.C. rejected Schroer’s contention that his claim was “sex stereotyping” under 
Price Waterhouse.
96
  Judge Robertson opined that the Price Waterhouse holding was 
“considerably more narrow than its sweeping language suggests.”97  The court added that 
Price Waterhouse was limited to the “Catch-22” cases where it could be shown that men 
or women were suffering adverse consequences regardless of how they chose to represent 
themselves from a gender standpoint.
98
 
 When it said, ‘[I] n forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals 
because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of 
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes,’ the Court 
meant no more than that: disparate treatment of men and women by sex 
stereotype violates Title VII.  Adverse action taken on the basis of an employer's 
gender stereotype that does not impose unequal burdens on men and women or 
disadvantage one or the other does not state a claim under Title VII.
99
  
 
The court nevertheless rejected a motion to dismiss so that a more robust factual record 
could be developed with regards to another theory, namely that “discrimination against 
transsexuals because they are transsexuals is ‘literally’ discrimination ‘because of . . . 
sex.’”100  Specifically, the court requested scientific testimony as to the “basis for sexual 
identity in general, and gender dysphoria in particular.”101 
 Curiously, after the factual record was further developed, the court ruled in favor 
of Schroer, while simultaneously holding that it was not competent to decide the 
scientific issue the court itself had posed, because the testimony of the experts on both 
sides was “impressive.” 102  The court arrived at this result, by holding that it did not need 
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to reach the scientific issue, partially by looking to the plain language of the statute
103
 and 
partially because it held that the Library had engaged in impermissible sex stereotyping 
under Price Waterhouse.
104
  With respect to the latter holding, the court distanced itself 
from the Jespersen disparate treatment approach it had employed in Schroer I, holding 
that such a showing was not required where there was direct evidence of stereotyping as 
in the present case.
105
  Judge Robertson wrote, “I do not think that it matters for purposes 
of Title VII liability whether the Library withdrew its offer of employment because it 
perceived Schroer to be an insufficiently masculine man, an insufficiently feminine 
woman, or an inherently gender-nonconforming transsexual,” because in any event the 
factual record supplied evidence of sex stereotyping.
106
 
 D. What Schroer and Jespersen Mean to Transgendered Employees 
Schroer stands in stark contrast to Jespersen and its ilk.  Although the latter 
reaches its very different result through a very different set of legal gymnastics, Jespersen 
seems to supply employers with a foolproof guide to discriminate against transgendered 
employees and still steer clear of a court that may be taking a Schroer-like approach.  The 
expansive language of Schroer aside, an employer can easily establish a policy that 
actively discriminates against transgendered employees by requiring men to wear a 
certain uniform and women to wear a different uniform.  In a sense, then, Jespersen 
represents the stubborn persistence of the gender binary, silently thwarting the efforts of 
transgendered individuals, intersex individuals, and other advocates who would desire to 
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see gender liberated from the hegemonic uniformity imposed by employers that reflect 
mainstream prejudices.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The employer owns the image that it projects to society through its employees, 
but that does not mean that it may control every aspect of that image.  It is already 
forbidden for an employer to actively project an image of all males or all whites in the 
employees it hires, as it is forbidden for the employer to control its workforce’s gender 
behavior by telling women how to be women or men how to be men.  The next logical 
steps in this scheme are: 1) for courts to follow the examples of Salem and Schroer in 
admitting that transgendered individuals also have the right to protection under Title VII; 
2) to dismantle the gentle binary in recognizing that intersex individuals can state a cause 
of action for sex discrimination; and 3) to recognize sex-differentiated grooming 
standards for what they are: the employer’s coded tools, used to perpetuate a stereotypical 
image that obfuscates the truth in the service of a false uniformity. 
